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STRUGGLING WITH ARTICLE 101(3) TFEU: DIVERGING APPROACHES OF 
THE COMMISSION, EU COURTS, AND FIVE COMPETITION AUTHORITIES 
 
OR BROOK* 
 
Abstract  
The decentralized enforcement regime of EU competition law is based on the 
assumption that the obligation to apply the same Treaties provisions is sufficient to 
ensure a uniform administration of the law. This paper questions this assumption. 
Based on a systematic analysis of a large database of cases, it presents empirical 
evidence indicating that the Commission, EU courts and five national competition 
authorities have followed very different interpretations of the law when applying 
Article 101(3) TFEU. The paper uses the debate over the types of benefits that can be 
examined under Article 101(3) TFEU as an illustrative example of the struggle 
between the competition authorities for shaping the future of EU competition policy. 
 
1. Introduction  
ÒCompetition policy is not something neutralÓ, famously declared former European 
Commissioner for Competition, Karel van Miert, Òit is politicsÓ.
1
 Because the content 
and scope of competition policy reflect political choices, he maintained that 
competition policy cannot be understood without reference to the broader legal, 
economic, and social context in which it is applied.
2
 
This observation is particularly intriguing in the context of the decentralized 
enforcement of EU competition law. Since May 2004, the EU competition provisions 
are applied in a multi-level governance enforcement system by the Commission and 
the network of national competition authorities (NCAs) in parallel.
3
 In fact, almost 
90% of the investigations against infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
* PhD researcher, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam Centre for European Law & Governance. The 
author would like to thank Christina Eckes, Kati Cseres, Pinar Akman, Peter Whelan, the participants 
at the Clasf workshop Protection of Free Competition in Markets across History: Culture, Politics & 
Law, at University of Grandad, 13.9.2018, as well as the anonymous referees, for their helpful 
comments. All errors remain the authorÕs. 
1
 Van Miert ÒConfirmation hearing before the European ParliamentÓ (6 Jan 1995), as citied by 
Basedow, ÒThe Modernization of European Competition Law: A Story of Unfinished ConceptsÓ, 42 
Texas International Law Journal (2007), 429-440, at 431. 
2
 Van Miert ÒCompetition Policy in the 1990sÓ, Speech at the Royal Institute of International Affairs 
(Chatham House, London 11 May 1993), as cited by Sauter, Competition Law and Industrial Policy in 
the EU (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 120. Also see Frazer, "Competition policy after 1992: The 
next step" 53(5) The Modern Law Review (1990): 609-623, at 623; Maher ÒNetworking competition 
authorities in the European Union: Diversity and changeÓ, 2002 European Competition Law Annual 
(2002), 223-236, at 224; Townley, Article 81 EC and Public Policy (Hart, 2009), pp. 11, 46; 
Simonsson, Legitimacy in EU cartel control (Hart, 2010), p. 431. 
3
 Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Arts. 
81 and 82 of the Treaty, O.J. 2003, L 1/1., Art. 3-5. 
now carried out by NCAs.
4
 As such, the decentralized enforcement has transformed 
the NCAs into the mediators of the economic and political forces that shape EU 
competition law.
5
 
The NCAsÕ new role, however, poses an inherent risk to the uniformity and legal 
certainty of the enforcement. Especially since the application of the EU competition 
provisions merits a wide margin of discretion, the NCAsÕ national, economic, and 
political traditions are prone to lead to a fragmented application.
6
 
As elaborated below, from the very inception of the decentralization initiative the 
Commission and Council were wary of this risk. The Commission attempted to scale 
down the influence of the national settings by adopting a set of notices and guidelines. 
This so-called modernization package7 aims to direct the substantive competition 
analysis to ensure the uniformity and legal certainty of the enforcement.
8
 Yet, those 
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This calculation is based on the data available on the ECN website. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/ statistics.html (last visited 17 Apr. 2018). 
5
 Maher, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 224; Cseres and Mendes, ÒConsumers' Access to EU Competition 
Law Procedures: Outer and Inner LimitsÓ, 51(2) CML Rev. (2014), 483-521, at 485.  
6 
Office of Fair Trading, Article 101(3) Ð A Discussion of Narrow versus Broad Definition of Benefits 
(2010). Available at: 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402172423/http://oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/events/Articl
e101(3)-summary.pdf (last visited 18 Apr. 2018); Commission, European Commission White Paper, 
on Modernization of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty (1999), para. 17. Also 
see Wils, Principles of European Antitrust Enforcement (Bloomsbury, 2005), pp. 6-7; Gerber, ÒTwo 
forms of modernization in European competition lawÓ, 31(5) Fordham International Law Journal 
(2008), 1235-1265, at 1239; Ehlermann, ÒThe modernization of EC antitrust policy a legal and cultural 
revolutionÓ, 37 CML Rev. (2000), 537-590, at 537-538; Temple Lang, FIDE Congress 1998: General 
Report on the Application of Community Competition Law on Enterprises by National Courts and 
National Authorities (1998). Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp1998_027_en.pdf (last visited 18 Apr. 2018), p. 3; 
Jones, ÒThe Journey toward an Effects-Based Approach under Article 101 TFEUÑThe Case of 
Hardcore RestraintsÓ 55(4) The Antitrust Bulletin (2010), 783-818, at 787-788; Sauter, Coherence in 
EU Competition Law (OUP, 2016), pp. 41-42; Maher, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 224; Simonsson, op. cit. 
supra note 2, p. 111. 
7
 The modernization package consists of Regulation 773/2004 detailing the competition law 
procedures, as well as notices and guidelines providing guidance to assist undertakings and NCAs in 
assessing the compatibility of a specific practice with EU competition law. It includes the Commission 
Notice on Cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities (OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, p.43); 
Commission Notice on Cooperation between the Commission and the Courts of the EU Member States 
in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC (OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, p.54); Commission Notice on 
Informal Guidance relating to Novel Questions concerning Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty that 
arise in Individual Cases (Guidance Letters) (OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, p.78); Commission Notice on the 
Handling of Complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, (OJ C 101, 
27.4.2004, p.65); Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the 
Treaty (OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, p.81); and Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty 
(OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, p.97). 
8
 Modernization White Paper, para 86; Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council, Ð Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003 (SEC(2009)574), para 3, 
9; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council - Ten Years of 
Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives (SWD(2014) 
notices and guidelines are merely soft law mechanisms. Although they are an 
important source of influence over the interpretation of EU competition law, they are 
self-binding on the Commission alone.
9
  
As a consequence, while the decentralization and the modernization package have 
undoubtedly stimulated an exceptional process of voluntary convergence to the 
CommissionÕs practices,
10
 the EU multi-level governance enforcement system 
empowers the NCAs to adopt diverse interpretations.
11
 Where EU primary and 
secondary laws or the case law of the ECJ do not prescribe otherwise, the NCAs 
enjoy a wide margin of discretion to shape their national approaches on the basis of 
their legal, economic, and social traditions.  
Previous studies have already examined how national procedural and institutional 
settings have influenced the application of EU competition law.
12
 Yet, the divergence 
in the substantive interpretation of Articles 101 and 102 have so far been mostly 
underexplored by the literature,
13
 as well as by the CommissionÕs policy papers 
evaluating the success of the decentralization.
14
  
This paper aims to fill this gap. It uses the debate over the types of benefits that 
can be examined under the provision of Article 101(3) for justifying an otherwise 
prohibited anti-competitive agreement as an illustrative example of the struggle for 
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9
 On the legal effects of soft law mechanisms on the enforcement of EU competition law see Stefan, 
ÒEuropean Union Soft Law: New Developments Concerning the Divide Between Legally Binding 
Force and Legal EffectsÓ. 75(5) The Modern Law Review (2012) 879-893; Georgieva, "The judicial 
reception of competition soft law in the Netherlands and the UK." 12(1) European Competition 
Journal 54-86 (2016). 
10
 Lianos and Geradin, Handbook on European Competition Law: Enforcement and Procedure 
(Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, 2013), pp. 578-583; Cseres and Mendes, op. cit. supra note 5, p. 486. 
11
 As confirmed by the ECJ in Case C-226/11 Expedia Inc. v Autorit de la concurrence and Others, 
EU:C:2012:795, para 29. 
12
 Commission Staff Working Document, Enhancing competition enforcement by the Member StatesÕ 
competition authorities: institutional and procedural issues, SWD(2014) 231/2; Cseres, ÒComparing 
laws in the Enforcement of the EU and National Competition LawsÓ, 3 European Journal of Legal 
Studies (2010), 7Ð44; Cseres, ÒQuestions of Legitimacy in the Europeanization of Competition Law 
Procedures of the EU Member StatesÓ 2 Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance 
Working Paper (2013); Guidi, Competition Policy Enforcement in EU Member States (Springer, 2016); 
Lachnit, Alternative Enforcement of Competition Law (Diss. Utrecht University, 2016); Dunne, 
ÒConvergence in competition fining practices in the EUÓ, 53(2) CML Rev. (2016), 453-492. 
13
 A series of papers by Botta, Svetlicinii and Bernatt is an interesting exception. See Botta, Svetlicinii, 
and Bernatt. "The Assessment of the Effect on Trade by the National Competition Authorities of the" 
New" Member States: Another Legal Partition of the Internal Market?" 52.5 Common Market Law 
Review (2015), 1247-1276; Svetlicinii, Bernatt, and Botta. "The Dark Matter in EU Competition Law: 
Non-Infringement Decisions in the New EU Member States Before and After Tele2 Polska." 43(3) 
European Law Review (2018), 424-446. 
14
 Commission, Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003; Commission, Ten Years of Antitrust 
Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003. 
shaping the future of EU competition policy. Relying on an empirical methodology, it 
draws on a large database of cases to systematically record the differences in the 
practices of the Commission, EU courts, and five NCAs. 
The paper offers two significant contributions to the existing scholarship. First, it 
is the first comprehensive qualitative and quantitative analysis of Article 101(3) as 
applied by various competition authorities. The paper thus provides unique 
information on the frequency and patterns of applying the Article in the multi-level 
enforcement system in general. Second, the paper sheds light to the largely 
unexplored divergence in the substantive national interpretations of the Article. The 
empirical findings uncover substantial weaknesses in the enforcement system, which 
were overlooked by earlier studies that are based on traditional legal methodologies 
and on anecdotal evidence. The empirical findings are used to negate the 
CommissionÕs contention that after a few years of decentralized enforcement a 
Òsubstantial level of convergence in the application of the [competition] rules has 
been achievedÓ.
15
 This divergence, the paper asserts, poses a serious obstacle for 
attaining the core aims of the EU competition law enforcement.  
Accordingly, Section 2 of the paper begins by outlining the empirical 
methodology and definitions guiding this study. Section 3 then presents the gap in EU 
primary and secondary law as to the type of benefits that can be considered under 
Article 101(3), as the source allowing for the adoption of various interpretations.  
Section 4 introduces the empirical findings on the CommissionÕs practice. It reveals 
that during the time of centralized enforcement, the Commission have not limited the 
types of benefits that can be examined under the Article. Yet, following 
decentralization, the Commission had advocated confining such benefits to narrow 
economic efficiencies. Section 5 demonstrates that not all NCAs have adhered to the 
CommissionÕs new approach, leading to a fragmented application of Article 101(3) 
throughout the EU. Section 6 focuses on the practice of the EU courts. It shows that 
although the courts have not fully endorsed the CommissionÕs new approach they 
have not taken a clear stand on the matter. Section 7 discusses the implications of the 
findings, suggesting that they compromise the effectiveness, uniformity and legal 
certainty of the enforcement. Finally, section 8 concludes.  
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 Commission, Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003, para 24. 
2. Methodology and definitions  
The empirical database for this study was comprised by applying a systematic content 
analysis
16
 on all of Article 101 public enforcement proceedings
17
 rendered by:  
(i) the Commission, since the establishment of the EEC in 1958 until 2017;  
(ii) the EU courts since the establishment of the EEC in 1958 until 2017. This 
includes appeals on the CommissionÕs decisions as well as ECJÕs preliminary 
rulings; and 
(iii)  the NCAs of five representative Member States (France, Germany, Hungary, the 
Netherlands, and the UK)
18
 since the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003 
decentralizing the enforcement in May 2004 and until 2017. The database also 
includes public enforcement proceedings of the national provisions equivalent to 
Article 101, but does not include decisions of national courts.  
For each case in which Article 101(3) is mentioned, the database specifies the type 
of benefits that were examined, and if such benefits justified an Article 101(3) 
exception.
19
 The classification of types of benefits follows a definition developed by a 
roundtable of experts and summarized in an OFT paper, which differentiates between 
three categories of benefits:
20
 
First, direct economic benefits are cost and qualitative efficiencies that occur to 
users of the product or service covered by the agreement. These benefits either 
directly affect the price or directly provide additional non-price value for consumers, 
such as new products, improvement of quality and greater product variety. 
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 On the systematic content analysis methodology, see Hall and Wright, ÒSystematic Content Analysis 
of Judicial OpinionsÓ, 96(1) California Law Review (2008); Kort, ÒContent Analysis of Judicial 
Opinions and Rules of LawÓ In Schubert and Aubert (Ed.) Judicial Decision Making (Free Press, 
1963); Tyree, ÒFact Content Analysis of Case Law: Methods and LimitationsÓ, 22(1) Jurimetrics 
(1981), 1-33; Neuendorf, The content analysis guidebook (Sage, 2016). 
17
 This includes all public enforcement actions published in any form (decision, opinion, press release 
or reference in an annual report); and using any regulatory instrument (decisions on infringements, 
inapplicability, settlements, formal or informal commitments, decisions not to investigate or to 
terminate investigations, and formal or informal opinions on conduct of a specific undertaking). 
18
 The five Member States were chosen out of the EU twenty-eight Member States by employing a 
purposive-heterogeneous selection method. This selection aimed to capture a wide spectrum of legal 
and economic structures, traditions, and approaches to Article 101(3). 
19
 Under Regulation 1/2003, Article 101(3) is a directly applicable exception. The term exemption is 
closely related to the old enforcement system of Regulation 17/62, in which undertakings had to notify 
their agreements to the Commission to benefit from the Article. Therefore, this paper refers to Article 
101(3) exemptions with respect to decisions granted under the old notification regime, and exceptions 
for decisions granted following the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003. 
20
 Office of Fair Trading, op. cit. supra note 6, para 3.3-3.17 
Second, indirect economic benefits are cost and qualitative efficiencies that do not 
occur in the market in which the agreement takes place, or has direct impact. Such 
benefits arise, for example, in two-sided markets. An agreement concluded on one 
side of the market could produce indirect benefits for consumers on the other side of 
the market.  
Finally, non-economic benefits are not directly related to the characteristics of the 
product or service of the agreement in question. These benefits are non-pecuniary and 
are often more subjective than direct or indirect economic benefits. They include 
cultural interests, environmental benefits (that are not directly valued by consumers 
within the relevant market), financial stability or the promotion of national or 
international interests. 
The differences between the three categories can be illustrated by an example of 
an agreement between manufacturers of paper used for printing journals, agreeing to 
combine production means, set a minimum price for the paper sold and move to 
greener production methods.
21
 Undoubtedly, a reduction in the paper prices due to 
economies of scale is a benefit that may be considered under Article 101(3) (direct 
economic benefit). Benefits to the journalsÕ advertisers may also possibly be taken 
into account. For example, a reduction in the price of paper could lead to a reduction 
in the price of journals. Subsequently, the number of subscribers may increase, 
rendering advertisements more effective (indirect economic benefit). Finally, the 
agreement could also generate indirect environmental benefits for the society as a 
whole. For example, greener production means could decrease the cutting of trees and 
pollution (non-economic health and environmental benefits).  
The distinction between the different categories of benefits is not dichotomous. It 
represents a scale that essentially relates to the degree of remoteness. Benefits 
generated to remote beneficiaries are more likely to be characterized as an indirect 
economic benefit than as a direct economic benefit. Moreover, a high degree of 
remoteness makes a benefit more intangible, and hence more similar to a non-
economic benefit.
22
 Therefore, the coding of cases, as presented below, includes sub-
categories for borderline cases that may be classified under multiple categories. 
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 This example is based on the one presented in ibid., para 3.13. 
22
 Ibid., para 3.13. 
The remainder of this paper is dedicated to exploring how the types of relevant 
benefits have changed over time and between the competition authorities. However, 
since systematic content analysis is rarely used in EU competition law legal 
scholarship, it may be appropriate to dedicate a few words as to its assumptions and 
limitations.  
Systematic content analysis of legal decisions focuses on cases as a representation 
of law as applied in practice. It demonstrates the factual and analytical richness of 
questions that come before competition authorities and courts, how undertakings 
structure their arguments, and how the authorities reason their decisions.
23
 At the 
same time, such a study also has some limitations. In particular, content analysis is 
inherently restricted to endogenic information extracted from the proceeding 
examined, without reference to exogenous data. In other words, the database does not 
reflect considerations beyond the wording of a case. Moreover, clearly, not all Article 
101 investigations result in fully reasoned administrative acts. While the database 
purports to cover all public enforcement of Article 101, aspiring to encompass all 
considerations of Article 101(3), it cannot fully code investigations that did not end 
with a reasoned decision. 
Despite the above limitations, content analysis provides a valuable source of 
information to study the divergence between the various competition authorities. The 
empirical findings presented below reveal that the competition authorities have often 
indicated the types of benefits that were considered under Article 101(3), even when 
such decisions took the form of an informal opinion or press release. This corresponds 
to the obligation imposed on the Commission to state reasons as to Òallow the Court 
and all parties concerned to ascertain whether [Article 101(3)] have been applied 
correctlyÓ.
24
 Cases in which such benefits were not fully or clearly indicated, 
however, are labeled accordingly.
25
 
Moreover, the data within the cases, even if limited, is the main source of 
information guiding undertakings and competition authorities alike. As the next 
section shows, because EU law tells us little about the particularities of applying 
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23
 Lawlor, ÒFact Content Analysis of Judicial OpinionsÓ, 8(4) Jurimetrics (1968), 107-130, at 107; Hall 
and Wright, op. cit. supra note 16, pp. 95-97. 
24
 Joined Cases C-8/66 C-9/66 C-10/66 C-11/66 Noordwijks Cement Accoord, EU:1967:75, pp. 93-94. 
This duty applies also to informal measures, such as rejection of complaints, see Joined Cases T-
231/01 and T-214/01 sterreichische Postsparkasse v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2006:151, para 114. 
25
 See category Òn/aÓ in Figures and Tables below. 
Article 101(3), such particularities are formed by a bottom-up approach. This is 
especially true following the decentralization. Under the realm of Regulation 1/2003, 
undertakings do not longer notify their agreements to the Commission prior to their 
implementation. Instead, they must self-assess whether their agreements can be 
accepted under Article 101(3). Given the gap in the law, such an assessment is 
essentially based on principles pronounced by the EU courtÕs judgments and the 
CommissionÕs and NCAÕs decisions.  
3. Background: the gap in the law 
From the early days of EU competition law, scholars, regulators and practitioners 
alluded to the uncertainty surrounding the types of benefits that can justify an Article 
101(3) exemption.
26
 Article 101(3) TFEU (ex. Article 81(3) EC and Article 85(3) 
EEC) stipulates that the prohibition on anti-competitive agreements may be 
inapplicable where an agreement contributes Òto improving the production or 
distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing 
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefitÓ.  
This vague wording raised two sets of important questions: First, the Article does 
not clearly define the nature of benefits that fall within its scope. From the wording of 
the provision it seems clear that cost-efficiencies related to production and 
distribution chains (Òimproving the production or distributionÓ), development of new 
technologies and products (Òtechnical progressÓ), and economic growth (Òeconomic 
progressÓ) are covered by the Article. Yet, the consideration of less quantifiable 
benefits is more equivocal. Article 101(3) does not indicate if industrial (e.g., 
protection of the national or the common market, development of industries, or 
stimulating employment) or public policies (e.g., promotion of culture, preservation 
of traditional forms of trade) may also constitute a relevant benefit. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26
 For example see Ehlermann, op. cit. supra note 6, p. 549; Monti, EC Competition Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), pp. 88-123; Odudu, The boundaries of EC Competition Law: the Scope of 
Article 81 (OUP, 2006), pp. 160-174; Van Rompuy, Economic Efficiency: The Sole Concern of 
Modern Antitrust Policy? (Kluwer Law International, 2012), pp. 253-266; Wesseling, The 
Modernisation of EC Competition Law (Hart, 2000), pp. 77-113; Witt, The More Economic Approach 
to EU Antitrust Law (Hart, 2016), pp. 160-174; Sauter, op. cit. supra note 6, pp. 64-75; Sufrin, ÒThe 
Evolution of Article 81 (3) of the EC TreatyÓ, 51(4) The Antitrust Bulletin (2006), 915-981, at pp. 933-
936; Townley, op. cit. supra note 2, pp. 141-176; Monti, ÒArticle 81 EC and Public PolicyÓ 39 CML 
Rev. (2002), 1057-1099, at pp. 1057-1059, 1064-1066; Petit, ÒThe Guidelines on the Application of 
Article 81(3) EC: A Critical ReviewÓ, 4/1009 Institut dÕtudes juridiques Europennes Working Paper 
(2009), pp. 6-9. 
Second, the Article also does not define the relevant beneficiaries. It indicates that 
ÒconsumersÓ should receive a fair share from the resulting benefits. Yet, it does not 
specify, for instance, whether only direct benefits to direct consumers could be 
considered or if also indirect benefits to consumers in other markets or to society as a 
whole could play a role. Moreover, it does not stipulate when such benefits should be 
realized. Can benefits to future generations compensate for the harm caused to 
competition in the present?
27
 
The answer to these questions goes to the core of EU competition law. Accepting 
a broad variety of benefits and beneficiaries limits the application of Article 101 in 
favor of promoting other public policies, while a stricter interpretation gives 
precedence to competition policy. Accordingly, the answer to these questions reflects 
different political theories of markets and societies, which manifest different national 
preferences towards the balancing of the economic, social and political goals of the 
EU.
28
 Moreover, in the decentralized enforcement regime of Regulation 1/2003, the 
answer to these questions defines the boundaries of EU integration. A broad 
interpretation of Article 101(3) leaves greater room for the promotion of national 
interests vis--vis the EU competition policy.
29
  
Despite their importance, these questions were not subject to debate during the 
lengthy political process preceding the adoption of the Treaty of Rome of 1958.
30
 
Instead, the wording of Article 101(3) was closely modeled after French law,
31
 the 
only Member State with a fully enacted competition regime at the time.
32
 Favoring 
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27
 Also see Office of Fair Trading, op. cit. supra note 6, para 1.6. 
28
 Townley, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 46; Basedow, op. cit. supra note 1, p. 431; Frazer, " op. cit. supra 
note 2, p. 623. 
29
 Brook and Cseres ÒMember state interest in the enforcement of EU competition law: a case study of 
Article 101 TFEUÓ. In Marton Varju (Ed.) Between compliance and particularism: Member State 
interests and European Union law (Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2018) (forthcoming). 
30
 Ehlermann, op. cit. supra note 6, pp. 538-540; Sufrin, op. cit. supra note 2, pp. 919-920; Goyder, 
Goyders's EC Competition Law (OUP, 2009), pp. 30-39; Forrester, ÒThe Modernisation of EC 
Antitrust Policy: Compatibility, Efficiency, Legal SecurityÓ, 2001 European Competition Law Annual 
(2002), 75-110, at pp. 89-91.  
31
 Similarly to its EU counterpart, Art. 59 ter of the French Price Ordinance No 45-1483 of June 30 
1945 provided an exception for agreements allowing undertakings to Òimprove and extend the markets 
for their products or to ensure further economic progress by means of rationalization and 
specializationÓ. English translation from Graupner, The rules of competition in the European Economic 
Community: a study of the substantive law on the comparative law basis with special reference to 
patent licence agreements and sole distributorship agreements (Springer Science & Business Media, 
2012), pp.170-173. 
32
 In particular, during the negotiations of the Rome Treaty Germany was busy with adopting its own 
competition law. See Ernst-Joachim Mestmdcker, ÒThe EC Commission's Modernization of 
Competition Policy: a Challenge to the Community's Constitutional OrderÓ, 1(3) European Business 
consensus over clarity, the open-texture wording entrusted the enforcers of the 
provision with a broad discretion to shape the scope of the Article, and in particular, 
to decide what types of benefits to take into account.  
This gap in the law, however, had only limited implications in the past. The old 
enforcement regime of Regulation 17/62 provided the Commission with the sole 
power to apply Article 101(3) in public enforcement proceedings.33 In fact, the 
CommissionÕs monopoly to issue Article 101(3) exemptions was based on the 
assumption that it was the only institution competent to apply the Article in a coherent 
and uniform manner. National enforcers, it was feared, would incorporate domestic 
interests in their decisions.
34
 
As a result of the procedural setting of Regulation 17/62, only the Commission 
had the power to determine what types of benefits could be considered under Article 
101(3), subject to the scrutiny of the EU courts. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the next 
section reveals that the Commission had elected not to limit its discretion in this 
regard. Supported by the EU courts, it adopted a broad reading of Article 101(3), 
incorporating both economic and non-economic benefits. 
4. Article 101(3) in the CommissionÕs practice 
Figure 1 describes the categories of benefits that were invoked by undertakings (left 
graph) and accepted by the Commission (right graph) for justifying an Article 101(3) 
exemption/exception.
35
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Organization Law Review (EBOR) (2000), 223-240, at 223-224; Pace and Seidel ÒThe Drafting and the 
Role of Regulation 17Ó, in Patel and Schweitzer (Eds.) The Historical Foundations of EU Competition 
Law (OUP, 2013), pp. 59-62. 
33
 Council Regulation 17/62 (EEC), First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, 
21.2.1962 OJ, P 013. 
34
 This position was summarized in the CommissionÕs Annual report of 1993, para 190 noting: Òthe 
grant of a derogation from the ban on restrictive agreements requires assessment of complex economic 
situation and the exercise of considerable discretionary power, particularly where different objectives 
of the EC Treaty are involved. This task can only be performed by the Commission.Ó Also see 
Modernization White Paper, para 17; Wils, op. cit. supra note 6, pp. 607; Gerber, op. cit. supra note 6, 
p. 1239; Ehlermann, op. cit. supra note 6, pp. 537-538; Temple Lang, op. cit. supra note 6, p. 3; Jones, 
op. cit. supra note 6, pp. 787-788.  
35
 The figure distinguishes between four enforcement periods of the CommissionÕs practice, as 
established by previous scholars: (i) 1958-1977, from the Treaty of Rome to Metro I judgment; (ii) 
1978-1987, from Metro I to signing the Single European Act (SEA) (iii) 1988-April 2004, from SEA to 
the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003; and (iv) May 2004-2017, the post-decentralization era. See 
Van Rompuy, op. cit. supra note 26, p.122; Wesseling, op. cit. supra note 26, p.9. For a detailed 
empirical analysis of the development of Article 101(3) across the four enforcement periods, see 
Brook, Coding the balancing of non-competition interests in Article 101 TFEU (PhD dissertation, 
forthcoming). 
Figure 1: Types of benefits under Article 101(3) TFEU Ð Commission 
        Direct economic        Indirect economic 
        Non-economic        Unclear: direct or indirect economic  
        Unclear: economic or non-economic        Outright rejected/accepted 
        N/a          
                (a) Art. 101(3) Invoked                 (b) exemptions/exception granted 
 
The figure specifics the number of instances each category of benefits was invoked and accepted. In 
some proceedings, more than one benefit was examined.  
 The empirical findings are also summarized in Table 1, which specifies the 
number of Article 101 TFEU proceedings in which each type of benefits was invoked 
and accepted. The brackets indicate the percentage of instances in which the types of 
benefits were examined, from the total number of instances in which Article 101(3) 
was invoked/accepted during each period. 
The figure and table point to a transformation in the invocation and acceptance 
rates of the different categories of benefits across the enforcement periods. As 
Table 1: Number of proceedings according to types of benefits under Article 
101(3) Ð Commission 
 Article 
101(3) 
argued/ 
accepted 
Direct 
economic  
Unclear: 
direct or 
indirect 
economic  
Indirect 
economic  
Unclear: 
economic 
or non-
economic  
Non-
economic  
Other Outright 
rejected 
or 
accepted 
n/a  
Article 101(3) invoked by undertakings 
1958-1977 78 75 (77%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (2%) 0 (0%) 10 (10%) 10 (10%) 
1978-1987 97 80 (66%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 4 (3%) 8 (7%) 0 (0%) 10 (8%) 19 (16%) 
1988-Apr. 
2004 
154 
117 
(55%) 
0 (0%) 2 (1%) 15 (7%) 20 (9%) 0 (0%) 15 (21%) 45 (7%) 
May 
2004-2017 
45 21 (31%) 3 (4%) 3 (4%) 6 (9%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 24 (35%) 11 (16%) 
Article 101(3) exemption/exception granted 
1958-1977 33 42 (98%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (2%) 
1978-1987 39 46 (94%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (2%) 2 (4%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
1988-Apr. 
2004 
90 87 (72%) 0 (0%) 2 (2%) 5 (4%) 10 (8%) 0 (0%) 1 (1%) 16 (13%) 
May 
2004-2017 
0 0 (n/a) 0 (n/a) 0 (n/a) 0 (n/a) 0 (n/a) 0 (n/a) 0 (n/a) 0 (n/a) 
0 
50 
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detailed below, they show that during the period of centralized enforcement, the 
undertakings invoked and the Commission accepted various types of benefits as a 
justification for an exemption, including non-economic benefits. Yet, following 
decentralization, Article 101(3) was essentially invoked with reference to economic 
benefits and was never accepted by the Commission as a justification for concluding 
an anti-competitive agreement.  
4.1 Centralized enforcement era: no limitation on the relevant types of benefits 
The possibility of relying on indirect and non-economic benefits to justify an Article 
101(3) exemption was rarely discussed during the first twenty years of the EU 
competition law regime. As Figure 1 and Table 1 show, during that period, Article 
101(3) almost exclusively pertained to direct economic benefits (77% of the instances 
in which the Article was invoked, and 98% of the instances in which it was accepted). 
The prospect of including broader types of benefits was first formally established 
by the ECJ landmark judgment of Metro I (1977).36 The case examined the operation 
of Saba, a manufacturer of electronics consumer goods, which established a selective 
distribution system in Germany. The Commission exempted the selective distribution 
system under Article 101(3), given its economic benefits.
37
 It accepted SabaÕs 
submission that the selective distribution enhanced the quality of its service and 
facilitated inter-brand competition.
38
 The CommissionÕs decision was challenged by 
Metro, a wholesaler who was denied accesses to SabaÕs distribution system. 
In a groundbreaking judgment, the ECJ agreed with the Commission that the 
system should be exempted. Yet, the Court followed a different line of reasoning. 
While the Commission based its exemption on direct economic benefits, the Court 
resolved to a teleological interpretation of Article 101. The Court held that Article 
101, read in conjunction with Article 3 EEC,
39
 entails that the appropriate standard for 
an exemption is not necessarily one of perfect competition. Instead, it introduced the 
notion of workable competition, in which the degree of competition protected under 
Article 101 is that which is Ònecessary to ensure the observance of the basic 
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 Case C-26/76, Metro v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1977:167. 
37
 SABA (IV/847), O.J. 1976, L28/19, para 38-50. The exemption was granted following modifications 
to the criteria for the appointment of wholesalers were made. 
38
 Ibid., para 38-42; Case C-26/76, Metro v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1977:167, pp. 1884, 1886-1887, 
1890.  
39
 Art. 3 EEC laid down a list of the Community ÒactivitiesÓ. A comparable article was not included in 
the Lisbon Treaties.  
requirements and the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty.Ó
40
 The Court 
maintained that the powers conferred upon the Commission under Article 101(3) 
show that the requirement of workable competition could be reconciled with 
Òsafeguarding of objectives of a different natureÓ, if they comply with the latter two 
conditions of Article 101(3).
41
 Consequently, the Court concluded that non-economic 
benefits related to stabilizing the provisions of employment justified granting an 
exemption.
42
 
With this somewhat vague statement, the Court opened the door for incorporating 
non-economic benefits under Article 101(3). The empirical findings summarized in 
Figure 1 and Table 1 confirm that following Metro I, the Commission accepted broad 
types of benefits as a justification for exemptions. In addition to direct and indirect 
economic benefits, the Commission justified exemptions on the basis of non-
economic benefits, such as environmental benefits, development of sports, and 
allocation and supply of scarce national resources among states.
43
 
The CommissionÕs decision in CECED (1999) provides a prominent example. The 
Commission exempted an agreement between an association of manufacturers of 
domestic appliances and national trade associations, by which their members agreed 
not to manufacture or import washing machines that fail to meet a certain energy 
efficiency criteria.
44
 The exemption was justified, inter alia, by the collective non-
economic environmental benefits resulting from a reduction in energy consumption. 
The Commission pointed to the agreementÕs significant contribution to the 
management of energy resources, reduction of CO2-emissions and efforts to combat 
global warming.
45
 Furthermore, the Commission considered cross-generational 
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 Case C-26/76, Metro v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1977:167, para 20. 
41
 Ibid., para 21-22. 
42
 Ibid., para 43. 
43 
For example, the Commission exempted agreements contributing to equitable distribution of oil 
supplies between countries (International Energy Agency (IV /30.525), O.J 1983, L 376/30); 
environmental and industrial policy considerations (Ford/Volkswagen (IV/33.814), O.J 1993, L 20/14; 
Exxon/Shell (IV/33.640), O.J 1994, L 144/20); Philips-Osram (IV/34.252), O.J 1994, L 378/37; 
EACEM energy saving commitment (IV/C-3/36.494), O.J 1998, C 12/2; ARA, ARGEV and ARO 
(COMP D3/35470 and COMP D3/35473), O.J 2004, L 75/59); and the development of sports 
(EBU/Eurovision System (IV/32.150), O.J 1993, L 179/23). 
44
 CECED (IV.F.1/36.718), O.J. 2000, L 187/47. 
45
 Ibid., para 52-56. 
benefits, referring to the agreementÕs Òcontribution to the EUÕs environmental 
objectives, for the benefit of present and future generationsÓ.46  
Notably, the empirical findings reveal that the Commission interpreted the ECJÕs 
judgment in Metro I in a broad manner. In Metro I, the Court defined the workable 
competition standard as the degree of competition necessary for the Òattainment of the 
objectives of the TreatyÓ.
47
 This wording implies that non-economic interests may 
justify an Article 101(3) exemption only if they are listed as an EU objective.48 Yet, in 
practice, the Commission did not reserve the application of the Article to the limited 
benefits rooted in the Treaties, and applied the Article without distinction also to 
interests lacking an EU law basis.
49
 Hence, the Commission took into account non-
economic benefits that are not, or were not at that time of the CommissionÕs decision, 
listed as objectives of the Treaties. For example, it examined employment 
considerations even before such interests were included in the Treaties,
50
 and assessed 
national rather than EU interests under the Article.
51
  
In addition to the proceedings portrayed by Figure 1 and Table 1, the Commission 
referred to non-economic benefits to specify or add weight to Article 101(3) 
exemptions that were mostly based on other grounds. This practice was especially 
common when considering environmental, employment and industrial policy 
benefits.
52
 In Synthetic fibers (1984), for example, the Commission explained that the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46
 Emphasis added. Commissions, Annual report (2000), p. 40. 
47
 Case C-26/76, Metro v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1977:167, para 20. 
48
 According to the Treaty of Rome, which was in force when Metro I was rendered, those objectives 
included: market integration (Art. 3(a)-(c) and (h) EEC); common policy in the sphere of agriculture 
and transport (Art. 3(d)-(e) EEC); competition (Art. 3(f) EEC); balanced payment methods (Art. 3(g) 
EEC); the creation of the European Social Fund and European Investment Bank (Art. 3(i)-(j) EEC); 
and the association of overseas countries and territories to increase and promote jointly economic and 
social development (Art. 3(k) EEC). 
49
 Moreover, the empirical findings reveal that the Commission had not indicated the legal source of 
the benefit justifying the exemption in the vast majority of its decisions. 
50
 For instance, in SSI (IV/29.525 and IV/30.000), O.J, 1982, L323/1, para 141 the Commission 
considered guaranteeing a steady income to tobacco wholesalers and retailers, and in Grohe's 
distribution system ((IV /30.299), O.J 1985, L 19/17, para 25-27 and Ideal-Standard's distribution 
system (IV/30.261), O.J/ 1985, L 20/38, pp. 26-27 the survival of the traditional plumbing trade. Also 
see Hornsby, ÒCompetition Policy in the 80s: More Policy Less CompetitionÓ 12(2) European Law 
Review (1987), 79-101, at p. 93. 
51
 International Energy Agency (IV /30.525), O.J. 1983, L 376/30; DSD (COMP/34493 and others), 
O.J. 2001, L 319/1. 
52
 The Commission took into account environmental benefits as additional justifications in Bayerische 
Motoren Werke AG (IV/14.650), O.J 1975, L 29/1 para 24; GEC-Weir Sodium Circulators (IV/29.428), 
O.J 1977, L 327/26, 8; Carbon Gas Technologie (IV /29.955), O.J 1983, L 376/17, 3-4; and BBC 
Brown Boveri (IV/32.368), O.J 1988, L 301/68 para 23. Employment benefits in: Synthetic fibres ((IV I 
30.810), O.J 1984, L 207/17, para 37; Ford/Volkswagen (IV/33.814), O.J 1993 L 20/14, para 36; 
Stichting Baksteen (IV/34.456), O.J 1994, L 131/15, para 27. Other industrial policies in P & I CLUBS 
coordinated closure of plants Òwill also make it easier to cushion the social effects of 
the restructuring by making suitable arrangements for the retraining and redeployment 
of workers made redundant.Ó
53
 Similarly, in Ford/Volkswagen (1992), it referred to 
investment, employment and harmonized development of the EU as benefits that were 
not sufficient to vindicate an exemption but should nevertheless be taken into 
account.
54
 The reference to non-economic benefits in those proceedings was done in a 
complementary fashion, making it hard to understand what weight was given to them. 
In conclusion, the empirical findings prove that the Commission had not limited 
the types of benefits that could be examined under Article 101(3) during the era of 
centralized enforcement. In its place, it embraced the leeway afforded by the wording 
of the Treaties to generously consider economic and non-economic benefits within the 
enforcement of EU competition law.  
4.2 Decentralized enforcement era: narrowing down Article 101(3)  
The old centralized enforcement system, as mentioned, was based on the assumption 
that only the Commission was able to exercise the considerable discretionary power 
required to apply Article 101(3) in a coherent and uniform manner. Yet, by the late 
1990s the Commission had drastically changed its approach. In its radical, largely 
unforeseen
55
 Modernization White Paper of 1999, the Commission proposed to fully 
decentralize the application of Article 101. In the context of the enlarged EU with 
more than twenty Member States, the Commission argued, the NCAs and national 
courts should apply Article 101(3) in parallel to the Commission.
56
 This proposal was 
largely accepted and implemented by virtue of Regulation 1/2003.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
(IV/30.373), O.J 1985, L 376/2, para 56; Phoenix-GlobalOne (IV/35.617), O.J 1996, L 239/57, para 
60; Atlas (IV/35.337), O.J 1996, L 239/23 para 51; IFPI ÔSimulcastingÕ (COMP/C2/38.014), O.J 2003, 
L 107/58, para 91; UK Network Sharing Agreement (COMP/ 38.370), O,J 2003, L 200/59, para 139; 
MAN/SAVIEM (26612), O.J 1972, L 31/29, para 29; Bayerische Motoren Werke AG (IV/14.650), O.J 
1975, L 29/1, para 24; United Reprocessors GmbH (IV/26.940a), O.J 1976, L 51/7, 6; Carbon Gas 
Technologie (IV /29.955), O.J 1983, L 376/17, 3-4; Optical fibres (IV/30.320), O.J 1988, L 236/30, 
para 59; Computerland ((IV / 32.034), O.J 1987, L 222/12, para 31; BBC Brown Boveri (IV/32.368), 
O.J 1988, L 301/68 para 23; PT-MCI (IV/34.857), O.J 1994, L 223/36, para 53-54; Rapid delivery 
services (IP-94-850); CECED (IV.F.1/36.718), O.J. 2000, L 187/47, para 50. 
53
 Synthetic fibres (IV I 30.810), O.J 1984, L 207/17, para 37. 
54
 Ford/Volkswagen (IV/33.814), O.J 1993 L 20/14 para 36. 
55
 Sufrin, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 918; Wils, ÒTen Years of Regulation 1/2003-A RetrospectiveÓ, 4(4) 
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice (2013), 293-301, at 294; Norberg, ÒMaking a Virtue 
out of Necessity and at the Same Time Strengthening European Competition Law EnforcementÓ, in 
Nicholas, Monti, Vesterdorf, Westbrook, Wildhaber (ed.) Economic Law and Justice in Times of 
Globalization (Nomos, 2007), pp. 527-528. 
56
 Modernization White Paper, para 46. 
The decentralized enforcement system aspires to uniformity throughout the EU.
57
 
To that end, it obliges the NCAs to apply the EU competition law provisions where an 
agreement affects trade between Member States. The Regulation further declares that 
in such event, EU competition law enjoys supremacy over conflicting national 
competition laws.
58
Nevertheless, from the very launch of its initiative, the 
Commission was concerned that the decentralized enforcement would result in the 
incorporation of national interests in the application of Article 101(3).
59
 To avoid such 
undue influence, the Commission reframed Article 101(3) in the Modernization White 
Paper as an ÒobjectiveÓ tool restricted to an economic assessment.
60
 It explained that 
Article 101(3) is intended Òto provide a legal framework for the economic assessment 
of restrictive practices and not to allow application of the competition rules to be set 
aside because of political considerations.Ó61  
Along the same lines, as part of its modernization package of 2004, the 
Commission introduced its Article 101(3) Guidelines (the ÒGuidelinesÓ). The 
Guidelines pronounce the CommissionÕs view on the substantive assessment criteria 
of the provision, aiming to direct the NCAsÕ application.
62
 The Guidelines advocate a 
narrow reading of the Article. They limit the nature of benefits, by prescribing that 
non-economic benefits could only be taken into account if they are Ògoals pursued by 
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58
 Regulation 1/2003, Art. 3. 
59
 Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council to empower the 
competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper 
functioning of the internal market COM(2017)142, p. 17; Riley, ÒEC Antitrust Modernisation: The 
Commission Does Very NicelyÑThank You! Part One: Regulation 1 and the Notification Burden" 
24(11) European Competition Law Review (2003), 657-672, at 659; Temple Lang, op. cit. supra note 
6; Guidi, op. cit. supra note 12, pp. 93-136. 
60
 Petit, op. cit. supra note 26, p. 6; Van Rompuy, op. cit. supra note 26, p. 257; Sufrin, op. cit. supra 
note 2, p. 964; Townley, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 80; Monti, op. cit. supra note 26, p. 1092 (2002 
article) and p.21 (2007 book); Cseres, ÒMulti-jurisdictional competition law enforcement: The interface 
between European competition law and the competition laws of the new member statesÓ, 3(2) 
European Competition Journal (2007), 465-502, at 169; Komninos, ÒNon-competition concerns: 
resolution of conflicts in the integrated Article 81 ECÓ, University of Oxford, Working Paper (L) 8.05 
(2005), p. 17; Merol, and Waelbroeck (eds). Towards an Optimal Enforcement of Competition Rules in 
Europe: Time for a Review of Regulation 1/2003? (GCLC Annual Conference, 11-12 June 2009. 
Groupe de Boeck, 2010), p. 82. 
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 Emphasis added. Commission Modernization White Paper, para 57. Also see para 72. 
62
 Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3), point 4.  
other Treaty provisionsÓ.
63
 Moreover, they limit the relevant beneficiaries, by stating 
that in principle, only direct economic benefits could be taken into account.
64
   
Commentators quickly pointed out that the CommissionÕs new interpretation of 
the Article is incompatible with the CommissionÕs and courtÕs previous case law, 
which reserved a significant room for indirect and non-economic benefits.
65
 
Ehlermann, the former Director-General of DG COMP until 1995, suggested a 
restricted interpretation of the Modernization White Paper, explaining: Ò[i]t would 
probably be an exaggeration to assume that, according to the Commission, non-
economic considerations are to be totally excluded from the balancing test required by 
Article [101](3). Such an interpretation would hardly be compatible with the Treaty, 
the Court of JusticeÕs case law, and the CommissionÕs own practiceÓ.66 
It is difficult to evaluate the degree to which the Commission had implemented its 
new approach in practice. As Figure 1 and Table 1 indicate, the Commission had not 
accepted an Article 101(3) defense following entry into force of Regulation 1/2003.
67
 
Moreover, in around half of the proceedings following decentralization, the 
Commission had outright rejected the applicability of Article 101(3) or did not 
discuss it in details, noting that no benefit was identified
68
 or sufficiently 
substantiated
69
 (see Òoutright rejected or acceptedÓ and Òn/aÓ categories in Figure 1 
and Table 1). The rest of the proceedings have mostly involved the consideration of 
direct economic benefits. Consequently, the Commission was not required to address 
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 Emphasis added. Ehlermann, op. cit. supra note 6, p. 549; Also see Van Rompuy, op. cit. supra note 
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Article. 
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the change in its approach or to clarify whether and how non-economic benefits could 
justify an exception. 
As argued elsewhere, the decline in the invocation rate of Article 101(3) in 
general, and of non-economic benefits in particular, could be explained by the priority 
setting powers granted to the competition authorities pursuant to Regulation 1/2003. 
While under the centralized enforcement system the Commission had to examine all 
notified agreements, following decentralization the Commission and NCAs have 
mostly focused on pursuing hard-core restrictions of competition, in which the 
conditions of Article 101(3) are unlikely to materialize.
70
 
The CommissionÕs policy papers, combined with the lack of decisions clarifying 
the successful application of Article 101(3) in the decentralized era, create great 
uncertainties as to the relevant types of benefits under the Article. This is especially 
true since the Commission does not have the legal competence to ignore the EU 
courtsÕ interpretation of the Article. Clearly, the Commission cannot invoke soft law 
mechanisms or use its decisional practice to set aside binding principles established 
by the courtsÕ case law. Indeed, as the next section discloses, not all competition 
authorities have converged to the CommissionÕs new approach.  
5. Divergence in the era of decentralized enforcement 
Regulation 1/2003 entrusted NCAs to apply Article 101(3) directly. As such, it 
delegated the decision on what types of benefits to consider under the Article from the 
exclusive competence of the Commission also to the national level. However, the 
development of the EU competition policy still remains the CommissionÕs 
prerogative.  
Accordingly, the Regulation provides that only the Commission can adopt a 
positive decision, that is to say a binding decision declaring that an agreement is 
compatible with Article 101.
71
 NCAs can only find that there are no grounds for 
action on their part, where on the basis of the information in their possession the 
conditions for establishing an Article 101 infringement are not met.
72
 As confirmed 
by the ECJ in Tele2Polska (2011), an NCA cannot make a binding decision declaring 
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CodingÓ 4 Pzmny Law Review (2016), 273‐290 and Brook, op. cit. supra note 35. 
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 Regulation 1/2003, Article 10. 
72
 Regulation 1/2003, Article 5. 
that Article 101 is not breached. It can only explain why an investigation was 
discontinued Ð for instance, because it believes that the conditions of Article 101(3) 
were fulfilled - while the Commission or another NCA may reach a different 
decision.
73
 The limitation of the NCAsÕ powers was justified by the need to ensure a 
uniform administration of EU competition law across Member States. Because an 
NCA can only adopt non-binding no ground for action finding, the Commission may 
subsequently reach a different conclusion.
74
 
The empirical findings disclose that there was no single form for such Òno 
grounds for actionÓ findings. Some were adopted as part of a formal decision (in 
which the findings of inapplicability are not binding in themselves), while others were 
included in informal measures or press releases. Some were short and concise, while 
other provided a full, detailed analysis.
75
  
Despite their non-binding, and often informal nature, no ground for action 
findings are critical for understanding the national approaches to Article 101(3). As 
mentioned, they are the main available source of information communicating the 
NCAsÕ interpretations. Although they are not binding de jure, such findings have an 
important role in guiding the practices of undertakings and competition authorities, 
thus carrying a de facto precedential value. 
Against this background, Figure 2 presents the number of instances in which each 
category of benefits was invoked by undertakings (left graph) and accepted by the 
five NCAs as a justification for a no ground for action finding (right graph). 
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 Figure 2: Types of benefits under Article 101(3) TFEU Ð NCAs (May 2004-2017) 
        Direct economic        Indirect economic 
        Non-economic        Unclear: direct or indirect economic  
        Unclear: economic or non-economic        Other 
        Outright rejected/accepted        n/a 
(a) Art. 101(3) Invoked                     (b) No grounds for action finding 
The figure specifics the number of instances in which each category of benefits was invoked or 
accepted. In some proceedings more than one benefit was mentioned. 
The empirical findings are also summarized in Table 2. Similarly to Table 1 
above, the brackets indicate the percentage of cases in which each type of benefits 
was examined from the total number of instances in which Article 101(3) was 
invoked and accepted in front of the relevant NCA. 
 
 Table 2: Number of proceedings according to types of benefits under 
Article 101(3) Ð NCAs (May 2004-2017) 
 Article 
101(3) 
argued or 
accepted 
Direct 
economic  
Unclear: 
direct or 
indirect 
economic  
Indirect 
economic  
Unclear: 
economic 
or non-
economic  
Non-
economic  
Other Outright 
rejected 
or 
accepted 
n/a 
Article 101(3) invoked by undertakings 
France 50 36 (46%) 1 (1%) 1 (1%) 16 (20%) 14 (18%) 0 (0%) 4 (5%) 7 (9%) 
Germany 43 39 (71%) 0 (0%) 2 (4%) 0 (0%) 5 (9%) 2 (4%) 3 (5%) 4 (7%) 
Hungary 60 45 (56%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 5 (6%) 6 (8%) 0 (0%) 4 (5%) 20 (25%) 
The 
Netherlands 
25 14 (35%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 6 (15%) 5 (13%) 0 (0%) 1 (3%) 14 (35%) 
UK 19 10 (59%) 2 (12%) 0 (0%) 1 (6%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 3 (18%) 1 (6%) 
Article 101(3) exception granted 
France 3 2 (67%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (33%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Germany 2 1 (33%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (67%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Hungary 
10 
11 
(100%) 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
The 
Netherlands 
4 2 (50%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (50%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
UK 0 0 (n/a) 0 (n/a) 0 (n/a) 0 (n/a) 0 (n/a) 0 (n/a) 0 (n/a) 0 (n/a) 
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The following sections demonstrate that the NCAsÕ approaches to Article 101(3) 
can be roughly divided into three groups: NCAs that followed the CommissionÕs new 
approach and restricted the provision to direct economic benefits (UK and Hungarian 
NCAs); those that took into account also indirect and non-economic benefits (French 
and Dutch NCAs); and those which took an intermediate approach or gave deference 
to the legal source of the restriction of competition, for instance when an agreement 
was an inherent part of an implementation of a national scheme (the German NCA). 
5.1. NCAs following the Commission  
 The first group of NCAs had accepted the CommissionÕs new approach, and 
restricted Article 101(3) to direct economic benefits. The UK NCA, for example, 
declared that it would only take into account such benefits by reference to the 
CommissionÕs Guidelines.
76
 Even when the UK NCA had examined an agreement 
that might have generated other types of benefits, it focused on narrow economic 
benefits. In its informal opinion on Rural broadband wayleave rates (2012), for 
instance, it assessed rate recommendations proposed by the National FarmersÕ Union 
and the Country Land and Business Association for wayleaves for broadband in rural 
areas. The analysis centered on quality improvements and cost savings stemming 
from the recommend rates. It did not examine potential social benefits emanating 
from improving services in rural areas.
77
 Similarly, in Modeling Sector (2016), in 
which the UK NCA examined collusion between modeling agencies and their trade 
association over modeling services prices, it declared that improvements to the 
working conditions of models could not be examined under Article 101(3), but only 
benefits that affect consumers, such as price reductions.
78
 
By the same token, the Hungarian NCA held that non-economic benefits - such as 
employment, price stability,
 
diversity of literature, promotion of research and 
education, fight against unlicensed software and freedom of the press Ð could not be 
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 Tobacco (CE/2596-03), para 7.58. The decision was annulled by the CAT judgment (1160/1/1/10 
1161/1/1/10 1162/1/1/10 1163/1/1/10 1164/1/1/10 1165/1/1/10); Short-form opinion of Rural 
broadband wayleave rates, para 8.12. 
77
 Short-form opinion of Rural broadband wayleave rates, para 8.12, 8.16-8.17. In comparison, as 
detailed in the next section, the Dutch NCA had taken into account broader benefits in the comparable 
case of ATMs in rural areas (14.1134.15). 
78
 Modeling sector (CE-9859/14), para 4.170. 
incorporated under Article 101(3).
79
 It has only accepted Article 101(3) defenses with 
reference to direct economic benefits.
80
 
The practices of the UK and Hungarian NCAs illustrate the strong impact of the 
CommissionÕs soft law mechanisms in directing national administration of EU 
competition law. Like the Commission, those NCAs have refused to take into account 
benefits that justified exemptions in the past. Yet, as we see below, not all NCAs have 
converged to the CommissionÕs new approach.  
5.2. NCAs rejecting the CommissionÕs new approach  
The second group of competition authorities interprets Article 101(3) to account for 
indirect and non-economic benefits. Similar to the old approach of the Commission 
and the EU courts, such authorities have taken into account a variety of benefits, 
including for the society as a whole and for future generations.
81
  
The empirical findings presented in Figure 2 and Table 2 affirm that the Dutch 
NCA has followed this approach. The national public debate surrounding the 
application of competition law to sustainability agreements presents the implications 
of such policy choice. The possibility of incorporating sustainability concerns under 
Article 101(3) was confirmed by the Dutch NCA in its informal opinion of MSC 
Shrimp Fishery (2011).82 The NCA held that national producers and the fishing 
association could set a control system to limit overfishing, in so far as it would be 
indispensable to meet sustainability concerns identified by scientific studies. At the 
same time, the NCA maintained that more restrictive practices could not be justified. 
The NCAÕs opinion was followed by a heated political discussion. Later that year, 
the Minister of Agriculture submitted a letter to the Dutch House of Representatives 
demanding the consideration of animal welfare and environmental benefits in the 
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 Hungarian Association of Book Publishers and Book Retailers (Vj-47/2004), para 103, 109, 111; 
Book market (Vj-96/2009-178), para 321-332; Navigation tools (Vj-26/2006), para 295; Newspaper 
distribution I (2.Kf.27.672/2008/7), 18-19. 
80
 For a list of cases see footnote 75 above. 
81
 ICN, Competition Enforcement and Consumer Welfare: setting the agenda (2011), p. 33. Available 
at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc857.pdf. (Last visited 18 Apr. 
2018). Claassen and Gerbrandy, ÒRethinking European Competition Law: From a Consumer Welfare 
to a Capability ApproachÓ, 12(1) Utrecht Law Review (2016), 1-15, at 3. 
82
 MSC Shrimp Fishery (7011). The NCA found that such population was not in danger during the time 
of issuing the decision, but that such measure might be necessary in the future. This opinion can be 
classified either as based on an economic benefit (efficient allocation of production means in the long 
term) or on non-economic benefit (sustainability for future consumers and society as a whole). 
Therefore, it was classified in Figure 2 and Table 2 as Òunclear: economic or non-economic benefitÓ. 
NCAÕs proceedings in the agricultural and nutrition sectors.
83
 In early 2013, the 
House of Representatives requested that the Minister of Economic Affairs instruct the 
NCA, by means of a policy rule, how to assess such agreements.
84
  
Following those requests, in May 2014 the NCA adopted its Vision Document on 
Competition and Sustainability.
85
 Interpreting both Dutch and EU competition law, 
this policy paper maintains that sustainability considerations play an important role in 
the enforcement of Article 101. According to the Dutch NCAÕs interpretation, Article 
101(3) covers indirect and non-economic benefits resulting from environmental- or 
animal-friendly production methods and efficient allocation of scarce resources.
86
 The 
NCA incorporates short and long term benefits for future generations,
87
 and benefits 
occurring in other markets.
88
 The Vision Document further emphasizes that 
sustainability considerations do not form a special category. Namely, other types of 
benefits are evaluated by the same analytical framework.
89
  
The principles of the Vision Document have guided the Dutch NCAÕs practice. 
The NCA has taken into account non-economic benefits related to the coordinated 
closure of coal plants to reduce omissions,
90
 cooperation between construction 
companies and public-housing corporations to renovate houses into energy-neutral 
buildings,
91
 and limitations on the sale of chickens whose production process failed to 
meet certain minimum environmental, public health and animal-welfare standards.
92
 
Although the NCA found that on balance the sustainability benefits could not justify 
the harm to competition in those cases, such benefits played an important role in the 
analysis. Similar considerations were incorporated in the NCAÕs decision in ATM in 
rural areas (2014), clearing a collaboration among banks and the Dutch Payment 
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 Letter from Henk Bleker (Minister of Agriculture) to the House of Representatives re sustainability 
initiatives and competition law (22.11.2011). 
84
 Dijkgraaf/Geurts motion of 24 January 2013, Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/2013, 33 400 XIII, 
nr. 99. 
85
 The Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets, Vision Document on Competition and 
Sustainability. Available at: https://www.acm.nl/en/publications/publication/13077/Vision-document-
on-Competition-and-Sustainability/ (Last visited 18 Apr. 2018). 
86
 ACM, op. cit. supra note 85, pp. 7, 14. 
87
 Ibid., pp. 11-12, 14. 
88
 Ibid., pp. 11. 
89
 Ibid., pp., 6. 
90
 The Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets, analysis of the planned agreement on 
closing down coal power plants from the 1980s. Available at: https://www.acm.nl/sites/default/files 
/old_publication/publicaties/12082_acm-analysis-of-closing-down-5-coal-power-plants-as-part-of-ser 
energieakkoord.pdf (last visited 18 Apr. 2018). 
91
 De troomversnelling (ACM/DM/2013/205913). 
92
 Chicken for tomorrow (ACM/DM/2014/206028), 5-6. 
Association designed to ensure access to cash in areas in which such service is not 
economic viable.
93
 
Towards the end of 2015, the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs had adopted 
another draft policy rule, aimed to further increase the role of sustainability 
considerations. In particular, it maintained that long-term benefits for the society as a 
whole should be taken into account when applying Article 101(3).
94
 Nevertheless, the 
Commission opposed this rule after it was published for consultation. According to 
the Commission, such interpretation would be incompatible with Article 101(3), 
which is restricted to direct benefits.
95
 Subsequently, the Dutch Ministry abandoned 
its draft rule. Yet, remarkably, in December 2016 the Dutch NCA stated that it Òwill 
not take action against sustainability arrangements that enjoy broad social support if 
all parties involved such as the government, citizen representatives, and businesses 
are positive about the arrangementsÓ.
96
 Consequently, the Dutch NCA will not 
enforce Article 101 against agreements generating indirect and non-economic 
sustainability benefits, even when such agreements cannot benefit from Article 101(3) 
according to the CommissionÕs interpretation. In practice, this policy rule has a 
similar impact to no ground for action findings. In both cases, the NCA will not 
enforce Article 101 given the environmental impact of an agreement.  
The French NCA followed a similar approach to the Dutch. It maintained that 
non-economic benefits Ð such as protection of jobs, living standards, fair trade rules, 
stabilization of prices, culture and protection of SMEs Ð are relevant for applying 
Article 101(3).
97
 In Supply of orthotics (2007), for example, it found that the 
conditions for an exception were met with respect to a pricing method set by a trade 
association. The NCA highlighted the benefits steaming from the pricing system not 
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 ATMs in rural areas (14.1134.15). Also see Dutch NCA annual report 2014, p. 61-61 
94
 Policy Instruction of 5 October 2016, Official documents Stcrt. 2016, 52945. 
95
 Attachment to the government letter to Parliament regarding competition and sustainability: 
Kamerbrief Minister van Economische Zaken aan de Tweede Kamer inzake Mededinging en 
Duurzaamheid d.d. 23 juni 2016, Kamerstukken II 2015/16, 30196, 463. 
96
 Authority for Consumer and Markets Òbasic principles for oversight of sustainability agreementsÓ, 
press release of 02.12.2016, available at: https://www.acm.nl/en/publications/publication/16726/ACM-
sets-basic-principles-for-oversight-of-sustainability-arrangements. 
97
 Bleach (05-D-03), para 117-121; Fruit and vegetables in Brittany (05-D-10), para 130-132; Essential 
Oils of Lavandin (05-D-55), para 78-85; Heating, ceramic sanitary and plumbing equipment (06-D-
03), para 1254-1261; Defibrillators (07-D-49), para 323-325; Fair trade (06-A-07); Quality label (07-
A-04). The French NCA also declared that it follows such approach in its answers to the questioner of 
the ICN, op. cit. supra note 81, pp. 10, 28, 32 
only for patients, but also for the national social security system as a whole.
98
 
Similarly, in its informal opinion of Cinema code (2009), the NCA declared that the 
assurance of a wider diffusion of cinematographic works in the general interest could 
be considered as an economic progress in the meaning of Article 101(3).
99
 
In 2009, the French NCA had seemed to revise its approach. Merely two months 
after issuing Cinema code, the NCA was hesitant to determine that cultural interests 
could justify a single price system for digital books. In its informal opinion on Digital 
books (2009), the NCA held that culture is a general interest rather than a true 
economic justification that can be examined under the Article.
100
 Along similar lines, 
in 2011, the NCA asserted that its mandate is limited to making markets work in the 
best interest of consumers. Promoting other public policies and, if need be, 
reconciling them with competition policy, is a task which may best be achieved by the 
government and parliament.
101
 This change in the French NCAÕs approach occurred 
in parallel to a reform of the national competition law enforcement,
102
 which aimed 
inter-alia for greater substantive convergence in the interpretation of the competition 
law provisions across the EU.
103
 
Despite the above statements, the empirical findings reveal that the French NCA 
has continued to examine non-economic benefits under Article 101(3) after 2009. It 
incorporated benefits related to public health, environmental considerations, and the 
development of rural areas, although they have not justified a finding of 
inapplicability.
104
   
The Dutch and French interpretations of Article 101(3) are incompatible with the 
approach of the first group of competition authorities. Unlike the CommissionÕs new 
approach, the Dutch and French NCAs were willing to limit the application of the EU 
competition rules in favor of promoting other economic, social and political aims. 
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 Supply of orthotics (07-D-05), para 64-65. This findings can be classified either as based on a direct 
economic benefit (quality improvements to patients) or on non-economic benefit (contribution of the 
French healthcare system as a whole). Therefore, it was classified in Figure 2 and Table 2 as Òunclear: 
economic or non-economic benefitÓ. 
99
 Cinema code (09-A-50), para 94. 
100
 Digital books (09-A-56), para 128. 
101
 ICN, op. cit. supra note 81, p. 25. 
102
 French Ordinance no. 2008-1161 on Modernization of Competition Regulation. 
103
Lasserre, ÒThe New French Competition Law Enforcement RegimeÓ 5 Competition Law 
International (2009), 15-20, at 16-17. 
104
 The French NCA held that those non-economic benefits are relevant under Article 101(3). 
Exceptions were not granted because the other conditions of the Article were not fulfilled. See Relay 
masts (11-A-20), para 9-33; Network sharing and roaming (13-A-08), para 65. 
While, admittedly, those NCAs accepted Article 101(3) defense in a handful of cases 
(see Figure 2 and Table 2 above), their interpretations have clearly deviated from the 
first group of competition authorities. 
5.3. Intermediate approach 
The German NCAÕs approach to Article 101(3) has mostly reflected an intermediary 
approach between the first two groups of competition authorities. Similarly to the first 
group, the German NCA limited the nature of the benefits. It declared that it bases its 
decisions only on market-based criteria, by noting that Òit is undisputed that there are 
other important economic and socio-political goals than ensuring competition. 
However, it is not the BundeskartellamtÕs responsibility to realise theseÓ.
105
 The 
German NCA maintained that other types of benefits, such as avoiding risky 
investments, combating a decrease in health care providers, or indirectly improving 
R&D efforts, are not relevant under this provision.
106
 By the same token, in Round 
timber in Baden-Wrttemberg (2017), the Dusseldorf Higher Regional Court refused 
to consider environmental benefits, holding that sustainability concerns related to 
management of forests, climate, water balance or clean air could not be taken into 
account within Article 101(3).
107
 This clearly clashes with the Dutch and French 
approaches described above, as well as the CommissionÕs and ECJÕs approaches prior 
decentralization. 
At the same time, the German NCA has not restricted the type of beneficiaries 
under Article 101(3). Departing from the CommissionÕs new approach, it assessed 
industrial policy considerations that were not directly related to the consumers in the 
markets in which the infringement had taken place. Similarly to the second group of 
competition authorities, the German NCA interpreted the Article to cover industry-
wide benefits related to the security of supply, bargaining power, the functioning of 
online platforms, and the elimination of Òwhite spotsÓ in internet access.
108
 Thus, 
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Emphasis added. Available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/EN/AboutUs/Bundeskartellamt/ 
bundeskartellamt_node.html (Last visited 18 Apr. 2018). 
106
 Rental of retail space in factory outlet centres (B1-62/13), para 323; Container glass (B4-1006/06), 
para 181-186; Ophthalmologists AOK (B3-11/13), para 41-42; Ophthalmologists AGB (B3-11/13), 
para 61-61. 
107
 Round timber in Baden-Wrttemberg (VI-Kart 10/15 (V)), para 327-328. 
108
 Long-term gas supply (B8-113/03-1), pp. 24-26; Basic Encryption of TV Programs Ð Commitments 
(B7-22/07), pp. 41; Sennheiser (B7-1/13-35), pp. 1-2; Adidas (B3-137/12), pp. 6-7; Asics (B2-98/11), 
para 613-622; ARD/ZDF online platform "Germany's Gold" (B6-81/11); Telekom and Telefnica (B7-
46/13), para 88-89. 
while the German NCA restricted the nature of benefits, it did not limit the relevant 
beneficiaries. 
Furthermore, the German NCA had invoked Article 101(3) to justify agreements 
that formed an inherent part of implementing a national scheme. In those cases, the 
NCA gave deference to the legal source of the restriction of competition. For 
example, in Coordination of tenders for sales packaging waste collection services by 
compliance schemes (2011), it accepted an agreement that was linked to the German 
Packaging Ordinance. An amendment to the Ordinance obliged compliance schemes 
for sales packaging waste to coordinate their tenders via a newly established joint 
body.
109
 Yet, the amendment did not make any stipulations as to the form of the 
coordination. The NCA affirmed that while the form of coordination chosen by the 
undertakings restricted competition in the meaning of Article 101(1), it was justified 
by Article 101(3) since it was a necessary element of the scheme.
110
  
More recently, in Construction of corvettes (2017) the German NCA decided not 
initiate proceedings against the planned participation of a German undertaking in a 
consortium for the construction and supply of corvettes ships that was commissioned 
by the German armed forces. The Public Procurement Tribunal at 
the Bundeskartellamt held that the planned award of the tender to the consortium had 
not complied with public procurement provisions, as the consortium was the only 
undertaking that was invited to participate in the award procedure.
111
 Nevertheless, 
the NCA found that the tender had met the requirements for an exception.
112
 Hence, 
although the German NCA had not declared that Article 101 was inapplicable to 
situations of state involvement, it accepted broader types of non-economic benefits, 
which otherwise could probably not justify an Article 101(3) exception.  
6. The silence of the EU courts  
The diverging approaches of the Commission and NCAs prove that the mere 
obligation to apply Article 101 was insufficient to ensure a uniform administration of 
the law. EU courtsÕ judgments clarify and defining the applicable legal regime could 
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 Article 6(7) of the German Packaging Ordinance. 
110
 Coordination of tenders for sales packaging waste collection services by compliance schemes (B4-
152/07), p. 6. 
111
See press release from 18.5.2017, available at: https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs 
/Publikation/EN/Pressemitteilungen/18_05_2017_VK%20Korvetten.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2. 
112
 Construction of corvettes (press release of 19 July 2017). The full reasoning for this case was not 
revealed on account of the confidentiality requirements in the affected security sector. 
have resolved some of this fragmentation, while strengthen the uniformity and legal 
certainty of the enforcement.
113
 
Nevertheless, the empirical findings presented in this section show that although 
the EU courts have not fully endorsed the CommissionÕs new approach to the relevant 
types of benefits under Article 101(3), they have not taken a clear stand on the matter 
following the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003. Before moving to discuss this in 
details, Figure 3 first presents the number of instances in which each category of 
benefits was examined by the EU courts when assessing an appeal on a CommissionÕs 
decision or a question referred for a preliminary ruling.  
Figure 3: Types of benefits under Article 101(3) TFEU Ð EU courts 
        Direct economic        Indirect economic 
        Non-economic        Unclear: direct or indirect economic  
        Unclear: economic or non-economic        Other 
        Outright rejected/accepted        n/a 
                  (a) GC                                            (b) ECJ (appeals)  
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 The role of the EU courts in ensuring a consistent and uniform application of EU law is specified by 
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The figure specifics the number of instances in which each category of benefits was invoked or 
accepted. In some proceedings more than one benefit was mentioned 
The empirical findings are also summarized in Table 3. The brackets indicate the 
percentage of cases in which each type of benefits was examined from the total 
number of instances in which Article 101(3) was discussed. 
 
The empirical findings presented in Figure 3 and Table 3 uncover a number of 
interesting observations. In the first place, they reveal the limited number of courtsÕ 
Table 3: Number of proceedings according to types of benefits under Article 
101(3) Ð EU courts 
 Article 
101(3) 
argued/ 
accepted 
Direct 
economic  
Unclear: 
direct or 
indirect 
economic  
Indirect 
economic  
Unclear: 
economic 
or non-
economic  
Non-
economic  
Other Outright 
rejected 
or 
accepted 
n/a  
GC 
1958-1977 
 
1978-1987 
1988-Apr. 
2004 
28 9 (32%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (4%) 0 (0%) 5 (18%) 13 (46%) 
May 
2004-2017 
25 9 (36%) 2 (8%) 0 (0%) 3 (12%) 2 (8%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 9 (36%) 
ECJ (appeals) 
1958-1977 6 2 (33%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (17%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 3 (50%) 
1978-1987 18 3 (17%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 3 (17%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 12 (66%) 
1988-Apr. 
2004 
3 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 3 (100%) 
May 
2004-2017 
4 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (25%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 3 (75%) 
ECJ (preliminary rulings) 
1958-1977 0 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
1978-1987 6 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (17%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 5 (83%) 
1988-Apr. 
2004 
1 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (100%) 
May 
2004-2017 
5 1 (20%) 1 (20%) 0 (0%) 1 (20%) 1 (20%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (20%) 
0 
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25 
30 
1958-1977 1978-1987 1988-2004 2005-2017 
judgments on the application of Article 101(3) in general, and on the types of relevant 
benefits in particular. The limited discussion in preliminary rulings is especially 
striking. In fact, Figure 3(c) discloses that national courts have rarely referred 
questions on the interpretation of Article 101(3) to the ECJ. This can perhaps be 
explained by the CommissionÕs monopoly to grant Article 101(3) exemptions prior to 
May 2004. National courts, therefore, had only reviewed the application of the Article 
in a small number of cases.
114
 Moreover, scholars suggested that following 
decentralization, national courts have not made preliminary references concerning 
matters covered by the CommissionÕs guidelines.
115
 According to this explanation, 
although the guidelines are non-binding soft law, they have reduced the ECJÕs 
opportunity to pronounce its approach on the application of the Article. 
A closer look at the courtsÕ practice following decentralization reveals that even in 
the few judgments in which they had the opportunity to examine the application of 
Article 101(3), they have often used general and ambiguous wording. The ECJÕs 
preliminary rulings have mostly briefly addressed the possibility of exception without 
detailing the application of the conditions of the Article to the specific case
116
 or 
merely referred to the wording of the provision.
117
 The courtsÕ judgments in appeals 
have often concisely affirmed the CommissionÕs analysis,
118
 or focused on procedural 
grounds.
119
 As such, the EU courts have not clarified the scope of the Article or 
assessed the CommissionÕs new approach.  
Nevertheless, there are a number of indications suggesting that the EU courts have 
not fully endorsed the CommissionÕs new approach limiting Article 101(3) to direct 
economic benefits.
120
 First, the empirical findings summarized by Figure 3 and Table 
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 On the competences of national courts when assessing Article 101(3) prior decentralization see 
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85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, OJ C 39, 13.2.1993, para 24-32.  
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 Blockx, "The Impact of EU Antitrust Procedure on the Role of the EU Courts (1997Ð2016), 9(2) 
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 Case T-193/02 Laurent Piau, ECLI:EU:T:2005:22, para 100-104. 
119
 Case C-171/05P Laurent Piau, ECLI:EU:C:2006:149, para 24; Joined Case T-259/02 to T-264/02 
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sterreich AG, ECLI:EU:T:2006:396, para 213-214. 
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 Also see Van Rompuy, op. cit. supra note 26, p. 208; Townley, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 47; Witt, op. 
cit. supra note 26, p. 444; Gerbrandy, ÒAddressing the Legitimacy Problem for Competition 
3 demonstrate that the EU courts have not limited the nature of relevant benefits. 
Accordingly, the ECJÕs preliminary rulings still declare that indirect and non-
economic benefits Ð such as those relating to financial services, regulated professions, 
IPRs, and sport Ð could justify Article 101(3) exceptions.
121
 Similarly, following the 
entry into force of Regulation 1/2003 the EU courts upheld a number of 
CommissionÕs decisions that were adopted prior to the change in its approach. The 
courts confirmed that the Commission was right to take into account non-economic 
benefits related to sports, the environment, and financial services.
122
 Moreover, they 
held that fighting free riding and promoting R&D and culture could, in theory, justify 
an exception.
123
 
Second, the pertinence of indirect and non-economic benefits is also supported by 
the parallel the ECJ had drawn between Article 101(3) and free movement exceptions, 
in which such benefits undoubtedly play a role. In Football Association Premier 
League (2011), for example, the Court examined an exclusive broadcasting license 
agreement. The ECJ held that the agreement restricted the freedom to provide 
services, and could not be justified by IPRs or sports related considerations since it 
went beyond what is necessary to achieve those aims.
124
 The Court later referred to 
this free movement analysis to explain also why the agreement could not benefit from 
an Article 101(3) exception.
125
 
Third, by a similar vein, the GC declared that the TreatiesÕ cross-sectional clauses 
create an obligation to consider non-economic benefits under Article 101(3). In 
CISAC (2013), it noted that when applying Article 101(3) the cross-sectional clause 
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on the protection of culture requires Òto bear in mind the requirements relating to the 
respect for and promotion of cultural diversityÓ.
126
  
Finally, the EU courts have also did not accept the CommissionÕs position limiting 
the beneficiaries to direct consumers. In GlaxoSmithKline (2009), they affirmed that 
the promotion of innovation in the pharmaceutical industry should be taken into 
account.
127
 In other words, future benefits to society as a whole may justify a 
restriction of competition. In MasterCard (2014), the ECJ seemed to take a more 
restrictive approach, requiring taking into account benefits to direct consumers as well 
as benefits to indirect consumers in Òseparate but connectedÓ markets.
128
 In any event, 
the courts clearly did not accept the CommissionÕs reading that limits the Article to 
direct economic benefits. Similar to the approaches of the French, Dutch and German 
NCAs, they also included benefits to other beneficiaries.  
Despite the above indications, the lack of an explicit and detailed guidance from 
the EU courts has left the Commission and NCAs additional leeway to shape their 
own interpretations of Article 101(3). By avoiding taking a clear stand on those 
matters, the EU courts have missed the opportunity to harmonize the interpretation of 
the Article throughout the EU and to increase the legal certainty.  
7. Implications 
The decentralized enforcement of EU competition law is based on the assumption that 
the obligation to apply the provision of Article 101 will result in a uniform 
administration of the law across the EU. Indeed, during the discussions preceding the 
decentralization initiative the Council emphasized that Ò[t]he abolition of the 
Commission exemption monopoly is not meant to pave the way for application of 
multiple national standards which may be different in content or enforcement from 
the standard of [EU] competition law (É) Such a situation could seriously hamper the 
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proper functioning of the internal marketÓ.
129
 Such view was shared by the 
Commission and the European Parliament.
130
 
The empirical findings presented in the previous sections, however, prove that the 
concerns over a fragmented application of the Article have materialized. They 
illustrate that the Commission, NCAs, and EU courts have adopted conflicting 
interpretations to one of the core notions of Article 101(3), namely to the types of 
benefits that can justify an otherwise anti-competitive agreement.  
The empirical findings further reveal that the procedural safeguard introduced by 
Regulation 1/2003 to ensure a consistent and uniform application of the Article have 
proven to be insufficient. As part of those safeguards, the Regulation has set the 
grounds for the European Competition Network (ECN), a forum for informal contact 
and consultation between the Commission and NCAs.
131
 Article 11 of the Regulation 
obliges the NCAs to inform the network before commencing a first formal 
investigative measure, adopting a decision requiring an infringement brought to an 
end, accepting commitments, or withdrawing the benefit of a block exemption 
regulation.
132
 Subsequent to those notifications, the Commission may initiate its own 
proceeding while relieving the NCA from its competence to apply Article 101 in the 
case.
133
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the Commission will do so only in exceptional cases, where NCAs are about to issue conflicting 
decisions in a single case, where a decision Òis obviously in conflict with consolidated case lawÓ or 
where a decision has Òsignificant divergenceÓ with respect to facts. The Commission may also initiate 
proceedings where its decision is necessary for the development of the EU competition policy. 
However, because the NCAsÕ findings of inapplicability are not binding, they are 
not notified to the ECN or examined by the Commission. Although the Commission 
had exercised some informal controls (i.e., by its abovementioned response to the 
proposed Dutch policy rule on sustainability agreements), the national interpretations 
of Article 101(3) are not reviewed in a systematic manner. This could be one of the 
reasons that the Commission and ECN have so far overlooked the existence of this 
divergence.  
Likewise, the empirical findings demonstrated that the fragmentation was not 
addressed by the judgments of the EU courts. The limited number of judgments 
discussing Article 101(3), coupled with the courtsÕ vague and general statements on 
the matter, has facilitated the conflicting interpretations. 
The lack of a single standard defining the types of relevant benefits under the 
Article poses a serious risk to the very aims of the decentralized enforcement system, 
namely to the effectiveness, uniformity and legal certainty: It hampers the 
effectiveness of the enforcement, because competition is not fully protected across the 
EU. It allows NCAs to favor other economic, social or political interests; it hinders 
uniformity, because the standard differs according to the Member State in which the 
agreement is examined. This compromises leveling the EU playing field and attaining 
full market integration; finally, the different legal standards impair legal certainty. It 
entails that the legal regime is unclear and is dependent on the authority which 
decides to pursue it. 
Beyond the clear implications on the development of EU competition law and 
policy, the above findings may also be generalized to other fields of decentralized 
application of EU law (e.g., consumer law). Questioning the assumption that the 
obligation to apply the same Treaties provisions results in a uniform administration of 
the law, they invite further research on how the enforcement setups informs the 
substantive interpretation of EU law.   
8. Conclusion 
The application of Article 101(3) in the multi-level governance system of Regulation 
1/2003 is generally considered a major success.
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 The Commission emphasized that 
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the ÒEU competition rules have to a large extent become the Ôlaw of the landÕ for the 
whole of the EUÓ.
135
 While the Commission admits that a certain level of divergence 
in the application of the Article persists, it was largely ascribed to differences in the 
institutional position of NCAs, their national procedures and sanctions. 
The empirical findings presented in this paper have negated this position. They 
pointed to the existence of an additional, possibly more significant, divergence in the 
substantive interpretation of Article 101(3). They illustrated that given the lack of 
detailed binding EU rules, the Commission, NCAs and EU courts have adopted 
considerably different approaches to the types of benefits that can be examined under 
the Article. 
Those different approaches are not a technical matter. They have a fundamental 
bearing on the nature and limits of EU competition law. A broad interpretation of the 
relevant types of benefits limits the application of EU competition law in favor of 
promoting other EU and national objectives, while a narrower interpretation favors 
competition interests. These choices strike a different balance between economic, 
social and political goals, and define the limits of EU integration.  
The differences in the application of Article 101(3), the paper maintained, are 
unsurprising. The seeds of this divergent application were planted during the drafting 
of the Rome and subsequent EU Treaties. The open-textured wording of the EU 
competition law provisions transferred many of the decisions on the details of their 
administration to the competition authorities. In the realm of decentralized 
enforcement, gaps in the law can and are being used by NCAs to mold the law to 
match their national preferences. Although this paper cannot ascertain whether the 
CommissionÕs concerns that Article 101(3) would be used to incorporate political 
interests were fulfilled,
136
 the various authorities have clearly adopted conflicting 
national approaches to its interpretation. 
Perhaps more surprising, however, is the disregard of this issue by the competition 
authorities, EU courts, and the academic literature. The divergence in the substantive 
interpretation of Article 101(3) poses a serious obstacle to the core aims of EU 
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competition law, namely to an effective, uniform and certain enforcement. Yet, the 
setup and evaluation of the decentralized enforcement system have so far been 
focused almost exclusively on institutional and procedural differences. Against this 
background, the paper offered a fundamental point of reference for identifying and 
understanding the significance of diverging national interpretations, and the role they 
play in the decentralized application of EU competition law. 
